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Abstract
Would the introduction of a corporate tax system with consolidated tax base and
formula apportionment lead to socially wasteful mergers and acquisitions across
borders? This paper analyzes a two-country model with an international investor
considering acquisitions of already existing target rms in a high-tax country and
a low-tax country. The investor is able to shift prots from one location to another
for tax saving purposes. Two systems of corporate taxation are compared, a system
with separate accounting and a system with tax base consolidation and formula
apportionment. It is shown that, under separate accounting, the number of ac-
quisitions is ine¢ ciently high in both the high tax and the low tax country. Under
formula apportionment, the number of acquisitions is ine¢ ciently high in the low
tax country and ine¢ ciently low in the high tax country. Under tax competition,
a novel externality arises that worsens the e¢ ciency properties of equilibrium tax
rates under separate accounting, but may play an e¢ ciency enhancing role under
formula apportionment.
JEL Codes: H25, F23
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I
1 Introduction
There is a certain tension between the free mobility of goods, production factors
and rms in the European common market and the fact that business taxation
is still uncoordinatedly determined at the national level. From the viewpoint of
multinational rms, decentralized tax policy has its benets and drawbacks. On
the upside, multinationals may benet from national tax di¤erences by shifting in-
come to low-tax locations and, thus, minimizing their overall tax liability. On the
downside, these rms have to cope with di¤erent national tax laws, di¤erent rules
for determining business income etc. However, both of these features of decentral-
ized tax policy are costly from a social point of view. This is why the European
Commission (2007a,b) has proposed to replace the current system by a new sys-
tem with a common consolidated corporate tax base and formula apportionment
of business prots to the individual a¢ liates within a multinational rm. Such
a system is supposed to substantially decrease compliance cost and suppress any
opportunity of tax-minimizing prot shifting. In the wake of these proposals, there
has been an extensive literature on the relative merits of separate accounting (SA)
and formula apportionment (FA). This literature generally shows that replacing a
system of SA by FA e¤ectively means replacing one set of distortions by another.
Recent interest in mergers and acquisitions (M&A) has renewed the question of
which system of corporate income taxation performs better. In fact, although the
larger part of cross-border investment takes the form of M&A, almost the entire
previous literature on the comparison of SA and FA is based on models where
capital is newly invested (greeneld investment). In this paper, we analyze how
these two regimes of corporate income taxation a¤ect a multinationals decision
to acquire or to merge with other rms and the implications of this decision of
corporate income tax competition between countries.
At rst glance, it seems evident that the FA system distorts M&A decisions
whereas the SA system is potentially e¢ cient. Under SA, taxes are location-
specic, i.e. before and after the merger, the same tax rate applies. Thus, both
the willingness to acquire and the willingness to sell are equally reduced by the
tax which, under plausible assumptions, implies that the M&A decision is not
distorted under SA. In contrast, the FA system implies that e¤ective tax rates are
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investor-specic, i.e. the e¤ective tax burden depends on where the multinational
investor has other production locations and whether they are located in high-tax or
low-tax countries. Hence, if positive tax rate di¤erentials exist there are incentives
to sell rms from high-tax countries to investors from low-tax countries and vice
versa, even though there is no real economic gain from such a transaction.1 The
ownership structure of multinational rms is therefore expected to be distorted by
tax rate di¤erentials under FA, but not under SA.2
We show that this rst glance view may be misleading. Precisely, we demon-
strate that the M&A decision of multinationals is also distorted under SA and that
this distortion may even be more severe than under FA. We consider a multina-
tional which acquires already existing target rms in two countries. Acquisitions
have a real economic e¤ect taking the form of a change in cash-ow (synergy). As
a benchmark, we show that, in the absence of prot shifting opportunities, the
allocation of ownership is e¢ cient under SA. However, if prot shifting within the
multinational is possible, the number of acquisitions is ine¢ ciently high in both
countries, i.e. the marginal synergy is negative. The reason is that the multina-
tional balances the negative synergy with the improved prot shifting opportunities
of an additional rm. Under FA, in contrast, the number of acquisitions is ine¢ -
ciently high in the low-tax country and ine¢ ciently low in the high-tax country.
The reason is that acquiring rms in the high-tax country increases the e¤ective
tax burden and acquiring rms in the low-tax country does the opposite. As a con-
sequence, the multinational balances the synergy e¤ect with the tax consequences
of an additional rm and, thus, chooses a negative marginal synergy in the low-tax
country and a positive marginal synergy in the high-tax country.
In a second step, we endogenize corporate tax rates by assuming that the two
countries engage in tax competition. In the symmetric tax competition equilib-
rium, the marginal synergy levels are e¢ cient, but the countriestax rate choices
are distorted by scal externalities. Under both SA and FA, there is a positive
tax base externality. If one country increases its tax rate, the other countrys tax
1This is always true as long as (after-merger) prots are not perfectly equal across rms and
locations.
2In a recent contribution, Hines (2010) seems to follow this line of argument concluding that
the adoption of formula apportionment creates incentives for new forms of tax avoidance through
mergers and divestitures.(p. 117/118)
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base increases, under SA because of prot shifting, under FA due to the multina-
tionals incentive to minimize the tax burden via changes in the apportionment
shares. In addition, we identify and characterize an M&A externality. Tax rate
changes in one country a¤ect the proceeds of selling rms to the multinational in
the other country. Under SA, the M&A externality is positive since an increase in
one countrys tax rate increases the value of an acquired rm in the other country
by improved prot shifting opportunities. In contrast, under FA the M&A extern-
ality is negative because the tax rate increase in one country reduces the value of
the acquired rms in the other country by a rise in the e¤ective tax burden. Taken
both scal externalities together, we conclude that tax rates are ine¢ ciently low
under SA, whereas under FA the negative sign of the M&A externality may render
corporate tax rates e¢ cient or ine¢ ciently high.
In the presence of M&A, both corporate tax regimes FA and SA distort the
multinationals investment decision and the countrieschoice of corporate tax rates.
In the end, it is an empirical question under which tax regime the distortions are
more severe. In our model, we show that SA is more distortive if concealment
costs are su¢ ciently low so that the multinationals prot shifting incentive is
strong. The empirical literature provides a lot of evidence for prot shifting by
multinationals,3 thereby suggesting that tax planning via shifting of paper prots
under SA is usually easier for multinational rms than a reallocation of physical
capital, the latter of which is source of distortions under FA. Such a view is further
supported by evidence reported in Mintz and Smart (2004) who show that under
the corporate income tax of Canadian provinces SA generates larger distortions
than FA.
Our analysis is related to two strands of literature. The rst strand is the stead-
ily growing literature on the comparison of SA and FA, see e.g. McLure (1980),
Gordon andWilson (1986), Mintz (1999), Eggert and Schjelderup (2003), Devereux
(2004), Nielsen et al. (2003, 2010), Sørensen (2004), Kind et al. (2005), Fuest et
al. (2007), Pethig and Wagener (2007), Riedel and Runkel (2007), Devereux and
Loretz (2008), Eichner and Runkel (2008, 2010) and Becker and Fuest (forthcom-
ing). None of these studies considers M&A but they establish some important
3For evidence on prot shifting and an overview of recent contributions in this eld, see
Huizinga and Laeven (2008).
3
results which relate to ours. On the one hand, they identify a tax base externality,
though without referring to M&A. On the other hand, they show that FAmay yield
ine¢ cient overtaxation and that this ine¢ ciency is less severe than undertaxation
under SA if concealment costs are low. However, previous studies do not identify
the M&A externality, and this externality is important for two reasons. First, it
provides a further, so far neglected, reason for ine¢ ciently high tax rates under
FA. Second, as the M&A externality is of opposite sign under the two principles, it
worsens e¢ ciency of tax rates under SA, but may play an e¢ ciency-enhancing role
under FA. Put di¤erently, taking into account M&A strengthens the argument in
favor of a reform that replaces SA by FA.
The second line of literature related to our analysis investigates the tax e¤ects
on M&A activities of multinational rms, see e.g. Swenson (1994), Auerbach and
Slemrod (1997), Andrade et al. (2001), Desai and Hines (2004), Hauer and Schulte
(2009), Becker and Fuest (2007, 2010) and Huizinga and Voget (2010). Becker
and Fuest (2009) consider the e¢ ciency properties of source and residence based
taxation in a model where investment takes the form of M&A. It is shown that
source based taxation is e¢ cient from a global point of view if residence based
taxes are ruled out, as reected in the benchmark result of our analysis. However,
they do not consider prot shifting, nor do they analyze a system with FA.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic
assumptions. In Section 3 we consider the benchmark of SA without prot shifting.
Sections 4 and 5 then consider M&A under SA with prot shifting and under FA,
respectively. Section 6 investigates tax competition and Section 7 concludes.
2 Basic model assumptions
Consider a world with two identical countries labeled a and b. In each country
there are immobile rms owned by the residents of this country. We refer to these
rms as national rms, as opposed to multinational rms which will be introduced
below. Without loss of generality, the mass of immobile rms is normalized to
one in both countries. Each national rm earns a before-tax prot  > 0, which
is taken as given. The after-tax prot earned by each national rm in country
i 2 fa; bg amounts to (1  ti), where ti is the statutory tax rate of the corporate
4
income tax imposed by the government of country i.
Next to the national rm sector, there is a sector of multinational rms. The
number of multinationals is normalized to unity. The multinational considers
acquisitions of national rms in the two countries.4 If a rm is acquired, the
change of ownership is not accompanied by a relocation of real capital. However,
the ownership change does have a real economic e¤ect. It changes the cash ow
of the target rm in country i by a synergy i, which is drawn from a uniform
distribution over the interval [;] with  < 0 < . A positive value of the
synergy may be interpreted as the result of cost savings due to superior technology
or an increase in output value due to access to a brand name or better distribution
systems. The synergy may be negative if, e.g., the national rm is forced to adopt
standards of the multinational that do not reect the local conditions properly.
The acquisition price paid by the multinational to the owner of the national
rm with synergy i is denoted by P (i). This price crucially depends on the
market conditions and the nature of the synergy. Assume, for instance, that the
multinational rm just needs a distribution network in the market where the target
rms are located. Each target rm could provide this service. In this case, the
acquirer would keep the whole surplus. A contrary example is that the synergy
is generated by market specic knowledge of the target rm which is worth more
if the multinational investor can use it. Then, multinational investors may bid
for the target rm and the whole surplus is received by the seller. In order to
capture such di¤erent cases in a tractable way we denote the surplus generated
by acquiring rm i in country i by Z(i) and assume that both parties, seller
and acquirer, get a fraction of this surplus. Denoting the acquirers fraction of the
surplus by  2 [0; 1], the price of acquiring rm i amounts to
P (i) = (1  ti) + (1  )Z(i): (1)
The acquisition price is the sum of the sellers reservation price, equal to the after-
tax prot if the rm stays national, and the sellers fraction of the surplus. The
4We assume that the acquisition targets are only the national rms. We thus abstract from
the possibility that a change in rm ownership occurs between multinational rms. Moreover,
there is no choice of organization form, i.e. of becoming a multinational or staying a national
rm, like in Bucovetsky and Hauer (2008).
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surplus depends on the mode of taxation and is specied below.
3 Benchmark: Mergers and acquisitions under
separate accounting without prot shifting
As a benchmark we consider the multinationals M&A decision when it is taxed
according to SA and when it does not have the opportunity to shift prot between
the countries. SA means that the tax burden of the rms is location-specic.
The after-tax prot of rm i if it is acquired by the multinational thus reads
(1   ti)( + i). Subtracting the after-tax prot if the rm stays national gives
the surplus of acquiring rm i in country i, i.e.
Z(i) = (1  ti)( +i)  (1  ti) = (1  ti)i: (2)
Under SA and in the absence of prot shifting opportunities, the surplus equals
the synergy less the tax payments on this synergy.
The multinational decides which of the national rms to acquire. It rst pur-
chases the rm with the highest synergy and then successively takes a look at
rms with lower synergy. Formally, in country i the multinational determines a
cut-o¤ level ui such that all rms with i  ui are acquired, while all rms with
i < 
u
i are not acquired. The multinationals total after-tax prot thus reads
 =
X
i2fa;bg
Z 
ui
h
(1  ti)( +i)  P (i)
i
di: (3)
Inserting (1) and (2) into (3) and rearranging gives
 = 
X
i2fa;bg
Z 
ui
(1  ti)idi: (4)
The multinational maximizes the after-tax prot (4) with respect to the cut-o¤
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levels ui for i 2 fa; bg. The rst-order conditions are given by
@
@ui
=  (1  ti)ui = 0; (5)
for i 2 fa; bg. It immediately follows
Proposition 1. Under separate accounting and in the absence of prot shifting
opportunities, corporate income taxes do not distort the allocation of ownership
across locations and rms, that is ui = 0 for i 2 fa; bg.
Proposition 1 implies that all acquisitions yielding a positive synergy are real-
ized, a result earlier derived by Becker and Fuest (2009). The intuition is that
corporate income taxes are purely source-based and, thus, perfectly capitalized in
share prices. From a di¤erent perspective, source-based taxes ensure capital import
neutrality and therefore do not distort the ownership structure of multinationals.
It is this benchmark against which Hines (2010), at least implicitly, evaluates
the allocative properties of a system with FA. However, this argument neglects why
FA is to be introduced in the rst place. At least in the context of the European
Union, FA is designed to get rid of prot shifting opportunities for multinational
rms. But prot shifting opportunities may themselves cause distortions in the
pattern of ownership and investment. This will be analyzed in the next section.
4 Mergers and acquisitions under separate ac-
counting with prot shifting
Prot shifting is modeled in the simplest possible way. We introduce a variable
si which reects prot shifted to a rm acquired in country i (if si > 0) or away
from a rm acquired in country i (if si < 0).5 Usual channels of prot shifting
are the manipulation of transfer prices of goods and services traded between the
rms within the multinational and the use of internal debt contracts. Prot shift-
ing does not change the multinationals overall before-tax prot. Hence, shifting
5Actually, si represents prot shifting of the rm characterized by i, so we have to write
si (i) instead of si. However, as prot shifting is the same for all rms in country i and thus
independent of i, as demonstrated below, we omit the rm index i for notational ease.
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from one rm is associated with an equal shifting to another rm. Formally, the
multinational faces the shifting restriction
X
i2fa;bg
Z 
ui
sidi = 0: (6)
Prot shifting comes at a cost that reects, e.g., payments for tax consultants or
the risk of being detected and penalty payments when shifting breaks tax law.
Formally, the concealment cost is given by C(si) = s2i =2 with  > 0. Hence, it is
U-shaped with a minimum at the point where there is no prot shifting.
With prot shifting the after-tax prot of rm i, if acquired by the multina-
tional, changes to (1   ti)( + i + si)   C(si).6 Subtracting again the after-tax
prot if the rm is not acquired gives the surplus
Z(i) = (1  ti)( +i + si) C(si)  (1  ti) = (1  ti)(i + si) C(si): (7)
The surplus generated by the acquisition thus equals the synergy plus prot shift-
ing, less tax payments on synergy and prot shifting and less concealment cost.
The multinationals after-tax prot in the presence of prot shifting reads
 =
X
i2fa;bg
Z 
ui
h
(1  ti)( +i + si)  C(si)  P (i)
i
di: (8)
Employing (1) and (7), equation (8) can be rewritten as
 = 
X
i2fa;bg
Z 
ui
h
(1  ti)(i + si)  C(si)
i
di: (9)
The multinational maximizes the after-tax prot (9) with respect to the cut-o¤
levels ui for i 2 fa; bg and prot shifting si for all acquired rms i  ui . In
doing so, it takes into account the shifting restriction (6). Denoting the Lagrangian
multiplier associated with this restriction by  and the Lagrangian by L, the rst-
6We assume that concealment costs are not deductible from the corporate tax base. Changing
this assumption does not alter our results, though.
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order conditions of the multinationals prot maximization are
@L
@ui
=  

(1  ti)(ui + si) 
s2i
2

  si = 0; (10)
@L
@si
= (1  ti   si) +  = 0; (11)
for i 2 fa; bg. According to equation (11), optimal prot shifting si is the same
for all rms i  ui acquired in country i.
From the rst-order condition (11) together with the shifting restriction (6), it
is straightforward to calculate the multinationals optimal prot shifting as
si =
tj   ti

nj
N
; (12)
for i; j 2 fa; bg and i 6= j, where ni =    ui is the number of rms acquired
in country i and where N = ni + nj represents to total number of rms acquired
by the multinational. As can be seen from (12), the multinational shifts prot
from the high-tax to the low-tax country. If country is tax rate is larger than
country js tax rate (ti > tj), shifting is from country i to country j (si < 0 < sj).
Moreover, shifting per rm in country i is independent of the rm specic synergy
i and is decreasing in the number of rms acquired in country i, relative to the
number of rms acquired in country j.
Inserting (12) in (10) gives the optimal cut-o¤ level for synergy in country i,
ui =  
(tj   ti)2
2(1  ti)
nj
N
2
; (13)
for i; j 2 fa; bg and i 6= j. From (13) we can prove
Proposition 2. Under separate accounting and in the presence of prot shifting
opportunities and a non-zero tax rate di¤erential ti   tj, the number of acquired
rms is ine¢ ciently high in both countries, i.e. ui < 0 for i 2 fa; bg. This
distortion is larger in the high-tax country, that is ti > tj implies ui < 
u
j < 0.
Proof. Overinvestment ui < 0 follows immediately from (13). The relation
ui < 
u
j for ti > tj is proven by contradiction. Suppose ti > tj implies 
u
i > 
u
j .
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Then (13) and ti > tj yield n2j=n
2
i < (1   ti)=(1   tj) < 1. It follows nj < ni and
ui < 
u
j , a contradiction.
Proposition 2 stands in stark contrast to the benchmark result in Proposition
1. If the multinational faces prot shifting opportunities under SA, it overinvests
in the sense that it acquires not only those national rms with positive synergy,
but also rms which yield a loss of cash ow once they are integrated in the
multinational group. This result captures an idea that has been oating around
in the public debate for a long time. A multinational rm acquires a domestic
rm and destroys part of its value, i.e. decreases its prot. In our model, this
happens because the acquisition of an additional rm has a greater value for the
multinational than prots and synergy alone. It facilitates prot shifting in the
whole enterprise. The multinational therefore balances the negative synergy e¤ect
with the improved prot shifting opportunities and overinvests in both countries.
Moreover, Proposition 2 shows that overinvestment is more severe in the high-tax
country. The intuition for this result is that negative synergies are subsidized by
the tax system (i.e.  tii > 0 if i < 0) and this subsidy is larger in the high-tax
country. Hence, the incentive to acquire rms with negative synergy is stronger in
the high-tax country than in the low-tax country.
A comparative static analysis will further clarify the intuition of these results.
By totally di¤erentiating (13) for i 2 fa; bg, it can be shown that
@ui
@ti
=
nj(tj   ti)
N3(1  ti)J

nj(N   2uj )(2  ti   tj)
2(1  ti)   2ni
u
j

; (14)
@ui
@tj
=
nj(tj   ti)
N3(1  ti)J

2ni
u
j (2  ti   tj)
2(1  tj)   nj(N   2
u
j )

; (15)
for i; j 2 fa; bg and i 6= j, where J > 0 is the Jacobian determinant of (13) which
has to be positive due to second-order conditions. From (14) and (15) we obtain
Proposition 3. Under separate accounting and in the presence of prot shifting
opportunities and a positive tax rate di¤erential ti   tj > 0, an increase in ti
increases the number of acquisitions in both countries, i.e. @ui =@ti, @
u
j =@ti < 0,
whereas an increase in tj does the opposite, i.e. @ui =@tj, @
u
j =@tj > 0.
Proposition 3 highlights the role of the tax rate di¤erential ti   tj for the
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distortion of the multinationals M&A decision under SA with prot shifting. If
country i is the high-tax country and if this country further raises its tax rate, then
the multinational acquires more national rms in both countries, since the tax rate
di¤erential and, thus, the marginal gain from prot shifting in each acquired rm
increases. The opposite e¤ect is obtained if the low-tax country j chooses a higher
tax rate because of the fall in the tax rate di¤erential.
5 Mergers and acquisitions under formula ap-
portionment
Under FA, taxable prot of the multinational enterprise is rst consolidated and
then allocated to each country according to some formula. Due to consolidation
the multinational loses its incentive for prot shifting. The consolidated tax base
of the multinational can be written as
b =
X
i2fa;bg
Z 
ui
( +i)di: (16)
The factors entering the apportionment formula usually include indicators of real
economic activity such as payroll, property or sales. In our stylized model, we
assume that each national rm employs exactly one unit of capital and that the
formula uses capital as the only apportionment factor. Hence, the fraction ni=N
of the consolidated tax base b is allocated to country i and taxed at the statutory
tax rate ti. The consolidated tax base of the multinational enterprise is therefore
taxed at an e¤ective tax rate given by
 =
niti + njtj
N
: (17)
The e¤ective tax rate equals the weighted average of the countriesstatutory tax
rates, the weights being equal to the apportionment shares in the two countries.
The after-tax prot attributable to rm i if acquired by the multinational
equals (1  )(+i). Note that under FA prot is taxed at the e¤ective tax rate
 instead of the statutory tax rate ti. Subtracting the after-tax prot in case the
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rm is not acquired gives the surplus of rm i. This surplus reads
Z(i) = (1  )( +i)  (1  ti) = (1  )i + (ti   ): (18)
The surplus equals the net-of-tax synergy of rm i plus the di¤erence of national
tax payments to tax payments under FA.
In order to obtain the multinationals after-tax prot under FA, we have to
subtract from the consolidated tax base the tax payments and the M&A payments
to the owners of the acquired rms. This gives
 = (1  )b 
X
i2fa;bg
Z 
ui
P (i)di: (19)
By using (1) and (18), equation (19) can be rewritten as
 = 

(1  )b  
X
i2fa;bg
(1  ti)ni

: (20)
The multinational maximizes after-tax prot (20) with respect to the synergy cut-
o¤ levels ui for i 2 fa; bg. The rst-order conditions read
@
@ui
= 

(1  ) @b
@ui
  b @
@ui
+ (1  ti)

= 0: (21)
Taking into account @b=@ui =  (+ui ), @=@ui = nj(tj ti)=N2 and b = N+~b
with ~b :=
P
i2fa;bg
R 
ui
idi > 0, condition (21) yields the optimal cut-o¤ levels
ui =
(ti   tj)nj~b
(1  )N2 : (22)
This expression immediately yields
Proposition 4. Under formula apportionment and a non-zero tax rate di¤erential
ti  tj, the number of acquired rms is ine¢ ciently high in the low-tax country and
ine¢ ciently low in the high-tax country, that is ti > tj implies uj < 0 < 
u
i .
FA prevents rms from tax minimization through prot shifting but introduces
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another distortion. The multinational rm hesitates to invest in the high-tax coun-
try since this investment would ceteris paribus increase the share of the consolid-
ated tax base allocated to the high-tax country and, thus, lead to an increase in
the e¤ective tax rate. Hence, the multinational balances the synergy e¤ect against
the higher tax payment and acquires not all rms with positive synergy in the
high-tax country. Analogously, the multinational prefers purchasing rms in the
low-tax country in order to increase the share of the consolidated tax base allocated
to this country and, thus, lower the e¤ective tax rate. Hence, the multinational
compares the synergy e¤ect with the saved tax payments and takes over some rms
with negative synergy in the low-tax country. In sum, we obtain underinvestment
in the high-tax country and overinvestment in the low-tax country.
In order to conduct a comparative static analysis, we need the derivatives
@=@ui = nj(tj   ti)=N2, @=@ti = ni=N and @~b=@ui =  ui for i; j 2 fa; bg and
i 6= j. By totally di¤erentiating (22), it can then be shown that
@ui
@ti
=
~b(1  tj)(nj  uj )
N2J
; (23)
@ui
@tj
=
~b(1  ti)(uj   nj)
N2J
; (24)
for i; j 2 fa; bg and i 6= j, where J > 0 is the Jacobian determinant of (22) which
is positive due to second-order conditions. Equations (23) and (24) imply
Proposition 5. Under formula apportionment and a non-negative tax rate dif-
ferential ti   tj, an increase in ti reduces the number of acquisitions in country
i and increases the number of acquisitions in country j, i.e. @ui =@ti > 0 and
@uj =@ti < 0, whereas an increase in tj does the opposite, i.e. @
u
i =@tj < 0,
@uj =@tj > 0.
Proposition 5 shows the decisive role of tax rate di¤erences for the distortion of
the M&A decision under FA. If country i is the high-tax country and if it increases
its statutory tax rate, then the tax rate di¤erential further increases and so gives
the multinational enterprise a stronger incentive for underinvestment in the high-
tax country and overinvestment in the low-tax country. A rise in the statutory tax
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rate of the low-tax country has the opposite e¤ect. Put di¤erently, the higher the
tax rate di¤erential between the two countries the larger is the distortion of the
multinationals M&A decision under FA.
So far, we can conclude that under both tax regimes the ownership structure of
multinational enterprises is distorted by di¤erences in statutory tax rates. While
under SA this distortion is caused by prot shifting opportunities, under FA the
distortion is due to a tax-minimizing choice of the apportionment shares. The
di¤erence in the quality of distortions is most obvious for the high-tax country.
Whereas acquisitions are ine¢ ciently high under the SA regime, the FA taxation
system would reduce the number of acquisitions up to a point at which there are
positive synergies which remain unexploited.
6 Tax competition
So far we focused on the multinationals M&A decision and assumed tax rates to
be exogenously given. In the following, the analysis is extended to the case where
the countries engage in tax competition. In doing so, we suppose each country
sets its corporate income tax rate in order to maximize welfare of its residents.
Country i is inhabited by a large number of identical households from which we
consider the representative one. Welfare of this household is reected by the quasi-
concave utility function U(ci; gi) where ci is the consumption of a private good and
gi represents consumption of a local public good provided by the government of
country i. Private consumption is nanced by private income which consists of
prot income from national rms that stay national and revenues from selling
national rms to the multinational.7 Public consumption in country i is nanced
by the revenues from the corporate income tax. These revenues comprise the tax
payments of the rms that stay national and the tax payments of the multinational.
7This denition ignores prot income which the household receives if it owns part of the
multinational rm, which is equivalent to assuming that the multinational is owned by residents
of a third country not explicitly modeled. Assuming partial ownership of the multinational rm
would introduce the well established tax exporting e¤ect rstly identied by Huizinga and Nielsen
(1997). This e¤ect slightly complicates the analysis but does not change its main conclusions
(provided that the tax exporting e¤ect is not too large). For an analysis of the tax exporting
e¤ect in the context of SA versus FA, see e.g. Nielsen et al. (2010) and Riedel and Runkel (2007).
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The exact calculation of both the income from selling rms to the multinational
and the corporate tax revenues depend on the tax principle used.
To start with SA, the private budget constraint of the household in country i
equates private consumption and private income. With (1) and (7) we obtain
ci = (1  ni)(1  ti) +
Z 
ui
P (i)di
= (1  ti) + (1  )
Z 
ui
h
(1  ti)(i + si)  C(si)
i
di: (25)
The public budget constraint in country i equates the expenditures for the local
public good and the corporate tax revenues. It reads
gi = (1  ni)ti + ti
Z 
ui
( +i + si)di: (26)
Country i chooses its tax rate ti in order to maximize ui = U(ci; gi) subject to (25)
and (26). In doing so, it takes as given the tax rate of country j 6= i. Hence, we
consider a Nash tax competition game between the two countries. The equilibrium
is determined by @ui=@ti = 0 for i 2 fa; bg. We follow most previous studies and
consider the symmetric equilibrium with ti = t, implying that ui = 0 and ni = n
for i 2 fa; bg. Hence, in the equilibrium of the tax competition game the ownership
structure is e¢ cient. This does not imply, however, that the corporate tax rates
are e¢ cient, too. The e¢ ciency properties of the equilibrium tax rate t can be
determined by scal externalities which give the e¤ect of one countrys tax rate on
the other countrys welfare. If the externality is positive (negative), the equilibrium
tax rate is ine¢ ciently low (high).
Under SA, we obtain the scal externalities by di¤erentiating ui = U(ci; gi)
with respect to tj, taking into account (12), (25), (26) and @ui =@tj = 0 for
i; j 2 fa; bg from (14) and (15). The result is
@ui
@tj
= MESA + TESA; (27)
15
with
MESA = Uc
@ci
@si
@si
@tj
= Uc
n(1  )(1  t)
2
> 0; TESA = Ug
@gi
@si
@si
@tj
= Ug
tn
2
> 0:
(28)
According to (27) and (28), the total cross country externality of a tax rate in-
crease can be decomposed into two sub-externalities. First, if country j raises its
tax rate, the multinational shifts more prot to country i. This improves the tax
base and welfare in country i and constitutes the positive tax base externality
TESA which points to ine¢ cient undertaxation. Second, the increase in country
js tax rate and the associated increase in prot shifting to country i raise the
value of a national rm in country i. Hence, for a given negotiation power , the
initial owner of a rm in country i is able to get a higher price when the rm is
acquired by the multinational. This raises private income in country i and consti-
tutes the positive M&A externality MESA which is positive, too, and aggravates
undertaxation. While the tax base externality is known from previous studies, the
M&A externality is novel. Previous studies do not obtain this externality since
they ignore M&A activities and, thus, also the revenues of initial owners from
selling their rms to multinational enterprises.
Let us now turn to FA. Using (1) and (18), the private budget constraint of
the household in country i can be written as
ci = (1  ni)(1  ti) +
Z 
ui
P (i)di
= (1  ti) + (1  )
Z 
ui
h
(1  )i + (ti   )
i
di: (29)
The public budget constraint in country i reads
gi = (1  ni)ti + tinib
N
= ti + ti
ni~b
N
: (30)
Country i maximizes welfare ui = U(ci:gi) with respect to the tax rate ti, taking
into account the budget constraints (29) and (30). The Nash equilibrium of this
tax competition game is determined by @ui=@ti = 0 for i 2 fa; bg. The focus is
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again on the symmetric equilibrium with ti = t implying  = t, ui = 0 and ni = n.
The symmetry property implies @=@ui = @=@
u
j = 0 and, thus, @ci=@
u
i =
@ci=@
u
j = 0 by (29). Moreover, from (30) and symmetry we obtain @gi=@
u
i =
 @gi=@uj =  t~b=4n. The comparative static results in (23) and (24) simplify to
@ui =@ti =  @ui =@tj = ~b=4n(1  t), where we take into account J = (1  t)2. The
scal externalities under FA can then be computed as
@ui
@tj
= MEFA + TEFA; (31)
with
MEFA = Uc
@ci
@tj
=  Uc1  
2
Z 
0
(i + )di < 0; (32)
TEFA = Ug

@gi
@ui
@ui
@tj
+
@gi
@uj
@uj
@tj

= Ug
t~b2
8(1  tn2) > 0: (33)
Equations (31)(33) show that the total cross-country externality of a tax rate
increase can again be decomposed into two sub-externalities. First, if country j
raises its tax rate, the multinational reduces M&A in country j and increases it
in country i. This increases the share of the multinationals consolidated tax base
assigned to country i and, thus, tax revenues of country i. We obtain a positive
tax base externality TEFA that renders tax rates ine¢ ciently low. Second, the
increase in country js tax rate raises the e¤ective tax rate of the multinational.
This reduces the surplus of a national rm if it is integrated into the multinational.
The acquisition price for a rm in country i falls, so private income in country i
is reduced. The result is a negative M&A externality MEFA that points into the
opposite direction than the tax base externality and may even cause ine¢ cient
overtaxation. Again, the tax base externality is already known from previous
studies, but the M&A externality is novel since the previous literature does not
discuss the impact of FA on M&A decisions of multinational rms.
From (27), (28) and (31)(33) we immediately obtain
Proposition 6. Suppose the tax competition game between the two countries at-
tains a symmetric equilibrium. Then the equilibrium tax rate is (i) ine¢ ciently low
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under separate accounting, (ii) ine¢ ciently low or high under formula apportion-
ment and (iii) more e¢ cient under formula apportionment than under separate
accounting if the concealment cost parameter  is not too high.
Under SA, the tax base externality and the M&A externality are both positive.
The countries therefore choose tax rates that are lower than the e¢ cient ones. In
contrast, under FA the tax base externality is positive, while the newly derived
M&A externality is negative. If the latter externality overcompensates the former,
the countries end up with ine¢ ciently high tax rates. In addition, for low values
of the concealment cost parameter  the multinationals incentive to shift prot
between the two countries is high. In such a case, both the tax base externality
and the M&A externality are large under SA and the sum of the two externalities
is (absolutely) larger under SA than under FA. The consequence is that replacing
SA by FA shifts the tax rates closer to their e¢ cient level.
The novelty of Proposition 6 is twofold. First, it derives a new reason why
corporate tax rates under FA may be ine¢ ciently high. Previous studies have
already proven the possibility of overtaxation, see e.g. Nielsen et al. (2010) and
Eichner and Runkel (2008). But they do not take into account M&A and therefore
cannot identify the M&A externality as a possible reason for ine¢ ciently high tax
rates. Second, previous studies also have already proven the result that for low
concealment cost FA is superior to SA.8 But again, they ignore M&A activities of
multinationals and, thus, the M&A externality. As this externality is of opposite
sign under the two tax principles, it worsens e¢ ciency of tax rates under SA, but
plays an e¢ ciency-enhancing role under FA. Put di¤erently, taking into account
M&A strengthens the argument in favor of a switch from SA to FA.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have investigated how taxes a¤ect the decisions of multinational
rms to acquire other rms. We have compared two di¤erent regimes of corporate
taxation, a system with SA and a system with a consolidated corporate tax base
8Eichner and Runkel (2010) even identify empirically relevant cases where the superiority of
FA holds independent of the size of the concealment cost.
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and FA. Our results imply that both tax regimes distort the international alloc-
ation of ownership. Under SA, the multinational rm acquires too many rms
in low-tax and high-tax countries due to additional prot shifting opportunities
related to the acquisition of rms. Under FA, the number of acquisitions is too
high in low-tax countries and too low in high-tax countries since these distortions
allow the multinational to lower its e¤ective tax burden by changes in the appor-
tionment shares. Under tax competition, a novel M&A externality of corporate
taxation arises which aggravates ine¢ cient undertaxation under SA, but may in-
crease e¢ ciency of tax rates under FA. Overall, we may conclude that, contrary to
recent claims expressed, for instance, by Hines (2010), SA distorts the allocation
of ownership and that this distortion may even be more severe than under FA.
References
[1] Andrade, G., Mitchell, M. and Sta¤ord, E. (2001). New Evidence and Per-
spectives on Mergers, Journal of Economic Perspectives 15(2): 103120.
[2] Auerbach, A. J. and Slemrod, J. (1997). The Economic E¤ects of the Tax
Reform Act of 1986, Journal of Economic Literature 35(June): 1213.
[3] Becker, J. and Fuest, C. (2007). Tax Competition - Greeneld Investment vs.
Mergers and Acquisitions, CESifo Working Paper No 2247.
[4] Becker, J. and Fuest, C. (2009). Source versus Residence Based Taxation with
International Mergers and Acquisitions, CESifo Working Paper No 2854.
[5] Becker, J. and Fuest, C. (2010). Taxing Foreign Prots with International
Mergers and Acquisitions, International Economic Review 51(1): 171186.
[6] Becker, J. and Fuest, C. (forthcoming). Tax Enforcement and Tax Havens
under Formula Apportionment. International Tax and Public Finance.
[7] Bucovetsky, S. and Hauer, A. (2008). Tax Competition when Firms Choose
their Organizational Form: Should Tax Loopholes for Multinationals be
Closed?, Journal of International Economics 74(1): 188201.
19
[8] Desai, M. A. and Hines, J. R. (2004). Old Rules and New Realities: Corporate
Tax Policy in a Global Setting, National Tax Journal 57(4): 93760.
[9] Devereux, M. P. (2004). Debating Proposed Reforms of the Taxation of Cor-
porate Income in the European Union, International Tax and Public Finance
11(1): 7189.
[10] Devereux, M. P. and Loretz, S. (2008). The E¤ects of EU Formula Appor-
tionment on Corporate Tax Revenues, Fiscal Studies 29(1): 133.
[11] Eggert, W. and Schjelderup, G. (2003). Symmetric Tax Competition under
Formula Apportionment, Journal of Public Economic Theory 5(2): 439446.
[12] Eichner, T. and M. Runkel (2008). Why the European Union Should Ad-
opt Formula Apportionment With a Sales Factor, Scandinavian Journal of
Economics 110(3): 567589
[13] Eichner, T. and M. Runkel (2010). Corporate Income Taxation of Multina-
tionals in a General Equilibrium Model, mimeo, University of Magdeburg.
[14] European Commission (2007a). CCCTB: Possible Elements of a Technical
Outline, Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base Working Group, Work-
ing Paper 57, Brussels.
[15] European Commission (2007b), CCCTB: Possible Elements of the Sharing
Mechanism, Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base Working Group,
Working Paper 60, Brussels.
[16] Fuest, C., Hemmelgarn, T. and Ramb, F. (2007). HowWould the Introduction
of an EU-Wide Formula Apportionment A¤ect the Distribution and Size of
the Corporate Tax Base? An Analysis Based on German Multinationals,
International Tax and Public Finance 14(5): 605626.
[17] Gordon, R. and Wilson, J. D. (1986). An Examination of Multijurisdictional
Corporate Income Taxation under Formula Apportionment, Econometrica
54(6): 13571373.
20
[18] Hauer, A. and Schulte, C. (2009). Merger policy and tax competition: The
role of foreign rm ownership, Working Paper.
[19] Hines, J. R. (2010). Income Misattribution under Formula Apportionment,
European Economic Review 54(1): 108120.
[20] Huizinga, H. and Laeven, L. (2008). International prot-shifting within mul-
tinationals: A multi-country perspective, Journal of Public Economics, 92(5-
6): 11641182.
[21] Huizinga, H. and Nielsen, S. B. (1997). Capital Income and Prot Taxation
with Foreign Ownership of Firms, Journal of International Economics 42(1-2):
149165.
[22] Huizinga, H. and Voget, J. (2009). International Taxation and the Direction
and Volume of Cross-Border M&As, Journal of Finance 64(3): 12171249.
[23] Kind, H., Midelfart, K.H. and Schjelderup, G. (2005). Corporate Tax Systems,
Multinational Enterprises, and Economic Integration, Journal of International
Economics 65(2): 507521.
[24] McLure, C. E. (1980). The State Corporate Income Tax: Lambs in Wolves
Clothing, The Economics of Taxation, O¢ ce of Tax Analysis, U.S. Treasury
Department, 327346.
[25] Mintz, J. (1999). Globalization of the Corporate Income Tax: The Role of
Allocation, Finanzarchiv 56(3-4): 389423.
[26] Mintz, J. and Smart, M. (2004). Income Shifting, Investment, and Tax Com-
petition: Theory and Evidence from Provincial Taxation in Canada, Journal
of Public Economics 88(6): 11491168.
[27] Nielsen, S. B., Raimondos-Møller, P. and Schjelderup, G. (2003). Formula Ap-
portionment and Transfer Pricing under Oligopolistic Competition, Journal
of Public Economic Theory 5(2): 419437.
21
[28] Nielsen, S. B., Raimondos-Møller, P. and Schjelderup, G. (2010). Company
Taxation and Tax Spillovers: Separate Accounting versus Formula Appor-
tionment, European Economic Review 54(1): 121132.
[29] Pethig, R. and Wagener, A. (2007). Prot Tax Competition and Formula
Apportionment, International Tax and Public Finance 14(6): 63155.
[30] Riedel, N. and Runkel, M. (2007). Company Tax Reform with a Waters Edge,
Journal of Public Economics 91(7-8): 15331554.
[31] Sørensen, P. B. (2004). Company Tax Reform in the European Union, Inter-
national Tax and Public Finance 11(1): 91115.
[32] Wilson, J. D. (1986). A Theory of Interregional Tax Competition, Journal of
Urban Economics 19(2): 296315.
[33] Zodrow, G. R. and Mieszkowski, P. (1986). Pigou, Tiebout, Property Taxa-
tion, and the Underprovision of Local Public Goods, Journal of Urban Eco-
nomics 19(3): 356370.
22
Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation
Working Paper Series
WP10/10 Becker, Johannes and Marco Runkel, Corporate tax regime and interna-
tional allocation of ownership
WP10/09 Simpson, Helen, How do firms’ outward FDI strategies relate to their
activity at home? Empirical evidence for the UK
WP10/08 Voget, Johannes, Headquarter Relocations and International Taxation
WP10/07 Devereux, Michael P. and Simon Loretz, Evaluating Neutrality Properties
of Corporate Tax Reforms
WP10/06 Davies, Ronald B. and Lourenc¸o S. Paz, Tariffs Versus VAT in the Pres-
ence of Heterogeneous Firms and an Informal Sector
WP10/05 Finke, Katharina, Heckemeyer, Jost H., Reister Timo and Christoph
Spengel, Impact of Tax Rate Cut Cum Base Broadening Reforms on Het-
erogeneous Firms - Learning from the German Tax Reform 2008
WP10/04 Koh, Hyun-Ju and Nadine Riedel, Do Governments Tax Agglomeration
Rents?
WP10/03 Dischinger, Matthias and Nadine Riedel, The Role of Headquarters in
Multinational Profit Shifting Strategies
WP10/02 Vrijburg, Hendrik and Ruud A. de Mooij, Enhanced Cooperation in an
asymmetric model of Tax Competition
WP10/01 Bettendorf, Leon, van der Horst, Albert, de Mooij, Ruud A. and Hendrik
Vrijburg, Corporate tax consolidation and enhanced cooperation in the
European Union
WP09/32 Bettendorf, Leon, Devereux, Michael P., van der Horst, Albert, Loretz,
Simon and Ruud A. de Mooij, Corporate tax harmonization in the EU
WP09/31 Karkinsky, Tom and Nadine Riedel, Corporate Taxation and the Choice
of Patent Location within Multinational Firms
WP09/30 Becker, Johannes and Clemens Fuest, Transfer Pricing Policy and the
Intensity of Tax Rate Competition
WP09/29 de la Feria, Rita, VAT and the EC Internal Market: The Shortcomings of
Harmonisation
WP09/28 Damjanovic, Tatiana and David Ulph, Tax Progressivity, Income Distri-
bution and Tax Non-Compliance
WP09/27 Grubert, Harry, MNC Dividends, Tax Holidays and the Burden of the
Repatriation Tax: Recent Evidence
WP09/26 Grubert, Harry, Foreign Taxes, Domestic Income, and the Jump in the
Share of Multinational Company Income Abroad
WP09/25 Maffini, Giorgia, Tax Haven Activities and the Tax Liabilities of Multi-
national Groups
WP09/24 Bach,Laurent and Nicolas Serrano-Velarde, The Power of Dynastic Com-
mitment
WP09/23 Dischinger, Matthias and Nadine Riedel, There’s No Place Like Home:
The Profitability Gap between Headquarters and their Foreign Subsidiaries
WP09/22 Ulph, David, Avoidance Policies - A New Conceptual Framework
WP09/21 Ulph, Alistair and David Ulph, Optimal Climate Change Policies When
Governments Cannot Commit
WP09/20 Maffini, Giorgia and Socrates Mokkas, Profit-Shifting and Measured Pro-
ductivity of Multinational Firms
WP09/19 Devereux, Michael P., Taxing Risky Investment
WP09/18 Buettner, Thiess and Georg Wamser, Internal Debt and Multinationals’
Profit Shifting - Empirical Evidence from Firm-Level Panel Data
WP09/17 Arulampalam, Wiji, Devereux, Michael P. and Giorgia Maffini, The Direct
Incidence of Corporate Income Tax on Wages
WP09/16 Keuschnigg, Christian and Evelyn Ribi, Profit Taxation and Finance Con-
straints
WP09/15 Shaviro, Daniel N., Planning and Policy Issues raised by the Structure of
the U.S. International Tax Rules
WP09/14 Karkinsky, Tom and Nadine Riedel, Corporate Taxation and the Choice
of Patent Location within Multinational Firms
WP09/13 Koh, Hyun-Ju and Nadine Riedel, Assessing the Localization Pattern of
German Manufacturing & Service Industries - A Distance Based Approach
WP09/12 Loretz, Simon and Padraig J. Moore, Corporate Tax Competition between
Firms
WP09/11 Desai, Mihir A. and Dhammika Dharmapala, Dividend Taxes and Inter-
national Portfolio Choice
WP09/10 Devereux, Michael P. and Christian Keuschnigg, The Distorting Arm’s
Length Principle
WP09/09 de la Feria, Rita and Ben Lockwood, Opting for Opting-in? An Evaluation
of the Commission’s Proposals for Reforming VAT for Financial Services
